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INTRODUCTION
What if people could enhance their cognitive abilities by simply applying small amounts
of electricity to their brains? The prospect is certainly tantalizing, but was previously
only the stuff of movies and books rather than a reality. Now, however, producers of a
new breed of devices marketed with taglines such as ‘power your mind’ and ‘unlock
your brain’s true potential’ are seeking to bring a real life slice of science fiction to
consumers.1
† A law clerk with the US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Andreas has held positions with the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and both the US Navy and Air Force JAG Corps. His research fo-
cuses on international, military, and criminal law and the intersection of neuroscience and law. He holds a
J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, certificate in neuroscience from the University of Penn-
sylvania, M.Sc. from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and B.A. from the University of
California, Los Angeles.
‡ An assistant professor of Neurology and of PhysicalMedicine and Rehabilitation at the University of Pennsyl-
vania (Penn), where he also directs the Laboratory for Cognition and Neural Stimulation. He obtained a B.A.
in psychology fromHarvard, and thereafter attended Harvard Medical School andMassachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), where he obtained his MD and a Master’s Degree in Health Sciences Technology. He
completed residency training in Neurology and a fellowship in Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology at Penn.
The central thrust of Dr Hamilton’s research is to use electrical and magnetic non-invasive brain stimulation
to explore the characteristics and limits of functional plasticity in the intact and injured adult human brain. He
is a faculty member of Penn’s Center for Neuroscience and Society, and has written and lectured about the
ethical implications of cognitive enhancement using non-invasive brain stimulation.
1 Anna Wexler, A Pragmatic Analysis of the Regulation of Consumer Transcranial Direct Current Stimu-
lation (tDCS) Devices in the United States, 2 J. L. & BIOSCI. 669, 680 (2015). Cf. Dan Hurley,
Jumper Cables for the Mind, Nov. 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/magazine/jumper-cables-
for-the-mind.html?pagewanted=all& r=0 (last accessed Apr. 12, 2016) (‘[I]f the science continues to show
that a little zap can safely boost our brainpower, surely some people will find it hard to resist.’).
C© The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Duke University School of Law,
Harvard Law School, Oxford University Press, and Stanford Law School. This is an Open Access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distri-
bution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that
the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com
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The apparatuses at issue are transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) devices
‘that utilize[] low amplitude direct current tomodulate brain excitability, facilitating or
inhibiting spontaneous neuronal activity’.2 The possible medical applications of these
devices have been extensively studied, as have possible cognitive enhancement effects.3
But all of this research has been undertaken by experts in controlled environments, and
thus far, ‘tDCS is not approved in the United States by the Food andDrug Administra-
tion (FDA) as a medical treatment for any indication’.4 As such, researchers may only
employ tDCSdevices in experimental settings and are highly constrained in their ability
to procure them.5
But the average consumer faces no such restrictions in terms of her ability to pur-
chase and use these devices.6 And althoughmeaningful risks associated with the use of
tDCSdevices have yet to be revealed,7 manybelieve that thenascent nature of this tech-
nology and its applications coupled with the complexity and relatively uncharted state
of the brain makes discovery of such risks a distinct possibility.8 Accordingly, a body
of literature has developed that argues that the broad and relatively uninhibited pub-
lic availability and use of tDCS devices is troubling, and criticizes perceived regulatory
deficiencies that have allowed this situation to develop.9
2 Marta Parazzini et al., Effect of the Interindividual Variability on Computational Modeling of Transcranial Direct
Current Stimulation, 2015 COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE &NEUROSCI. 1, 1 (2015).
3 Eg Roi Cohen Kadosh (ed.) THE STIMULATED BRAIN: COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENTUSINGNON-INVASIVE BRAIN
STIMULATION 181–454 (2014) (Broadly presenting research into the therapeutic benefits and cognitive en-
hancement effects of tDCS).
4 Wexler, supra note 1, at 671. See also Marom Bikson, Sven Bestmann & Dylan Edwards, Neuroscience: Tran-
scranial Devices are not Playthings, 501 NATURE 167, 167 (2013) (‘Patients receiving tDCS do so in a con-
trolled environment, under guidance from institutional ethics review boards and with strict criteria for patient
inclusion.’).
5 Wexler, supra note 1, at 671.
6 Id.; Hannah Maslen et al., Regulation of Devices for Cognitive Enhancement, 382 LANCET 938, 938 (2013)
(‘[L]aypeople can easily access [brain stimulation] devices, without regulation or oversight.’).
7 Eg F. Fregni et al., Regulatory Considerations for the Clinical and Research Use of Transcranial Direct Current
Stimulation (tDCS): Review and Recommendations From an Expert Panel, 32 CLIN. RES. & REG. AFF. 22 (2015)
(Reviewing a breadth of studies utilizing tDCS devices and finding that ‘the side-effects of tDCS are mild,
benign, and short-lived’); Andre Russowsky Brunoni et al., A Systematic Review on Reporting and Assessment
of Adverse Effects Associated with Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation, 14 INT’L J. NEUROPSYCHOPHAR-
MACOLOGY 1133 (2011) (Finding the instance and severity of reported adverse effects of tDCS device use
in studies to be minimal). But see Kate Riggall et al., Researchers’ Perspectives on Scientific and Ethical Issues
With Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation: An International Survey, NATURE: SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 6 (2015),
http://www.nature.com/articles/srep10618 (last accessedApr. 12, 2016) (Finding that tDCS researchers are
greatly concerned by a general lack of research into the practice’s adverse effects).
8 Eg Nicholas S. Fitz & Peter B. Reiner,The Challenge of Crafting Policy for Do-it-Yourself Brain Stimulation, 41
J. MED. ETHICS 410, 410 (2015) (Lamenting that, all too often, ‘authors give only passing reference to the
concerns that might arise with [tDCS device] misuse’); Hannah Maslen et al.,The Regulation of Cognitive En-
hancement Devices: Extending the Medical Model, 1 J. L. & BIOSCI. 68, 70–72 (2014) (Outlining concerns that
significant harms from tDCS device couldmanifest themselves inmultiple ways, including:misuse of the tech-
nology, interaction with medical or other substances, material neural changes in developing brains, or long-
term side-effects.); Veljko Dubljevic´, Victoria Saigle & Eric Racine,The Rising Tide of tDCS in the Media and
Academic Literature, 82 NEURON 731, 733 (2014) (Noting the lack of research into the potential detrimental
effects of tDCS device use.).
9 Eg Fitz&Reiner, supranote 8, at 411 (Finding it troubling that ‘[i]n theUSA and theEuropeanUnion, devices
marketed for tDCS are not covered by the existing regulatory framework’); Maslen et al., supra note 8, at 69
(Expressing strong concern ‘that these potentially risky devices are being bought and used by individuals with
little knowledge and training, and in the absence of rigorous regulatory safeguards’.); Dubljevic´ et al., supra
note 8, at 736 (Criticizing the fact ‘that tDCS is readily available as a service, product, or even a homemade
device’.).
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Yet to effectively assess the adequacy of the regulations governing a type of device,
one must have a firm understanding of the laws applicable to it in any given circum-
stance. In this vein, Anna Wexler has written an excellent overview and analysis of the
federal regulatory environment that applies to tDCS devices in the USA.10 She shows
that there is no general regulatory gap when it comes to these products. In situations
where specific medical device regulations do not apply to them, general products rules
do. There is no circumstance in which tDCS devices are not regulated in some man-
ner. Thus, criticisms that call for more regulation without meaningfully engaging the
full expanse of existing law undermine their own relevance.11
In this article, we expound on Wexler’s findings in two important ways. First, we
highlight one of the key consequences of a product being categorized as a medical de-
vice: that it must clinically prove its medical effectiveness in addition to the risks asso-
ciated with its use. This places a significant additional burden on producers; one that
is not necessarily appropriate when a product is destined for general consumers rather
than patients, particularly, when no substantial risks are proven to result from its use.
Second, we address the body of scholarship that, rather than asserting the existence
of a general regulatory gap when it comes to tDCS devices, argues that there are gaps
within general products and medical device regulations specifically. We counter such
contentions on two fronts. We note that the lack of a proof of effectiveness require-
ment under general products regulations is not a gap because, as asserted in the previ-
ous section, its absence is not inherently improper for products marketed to ordinary
consumers as opposed to patients. For the same reason, the alleged inapplicability of
medical device regulations to these tDCS devices is similarly not a regulatory gap. We
next illustrate that medical device regulations are not necessarily inapplicable to tDCS
devices destined for the general market. Instead, given the broad discretion the FDA
has in categorizing something as amedical device, the application of these rules is likely
simply a matter of government enforcement.
Overall, we supplementWexler’s work and call for further discretion andmore com-
prehensive legal analysis from those who argue that additional federal regulation is
needed for tDCS devices.12
CONSIDERATIONS OF DEVICE EFFECTIVENESS
With regard to applicable regulatory frameworks, tDCSdevices potentially fall into one
of two broad categories: medical devices or general consumer products.13 The former,
in relevant part, makes stringent demands upon those seeking to market their prod-
ucts as
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or
other similar or related article, including a component, part, or accessory, which is
10 Wexler, supra note 1.
11 Id. at 672 (‘[B]efore calling for additional regulation or concluding that there is a ‘regulatory gap’, it must first
be determined that the problem is the lack of regulation.’).
12 Id. at 696 (‘Rather than adopting an alarmist approach to the new reality of consumer brain stimulation, we
must navigate this unfamiliar terrain with practical, grounded assessments of social and regulatory issues.’).
13 See id. at 673 (Dividing the regulatory frameworks applicable to tDCS devices into those covering ‘medical’
and ‘consumer’ products).
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(1) recognized in the officialNational Formulary, or theUnited States Pharma-
copeia, or any supplement to them,
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other ani-
mals, or
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals.14
The applicability of this definition to tDCSdevices is analyzed in the next section.Of
relevance here is the fact that, once classified as a medical device, a product must clini-
cally demonstrate its safety and effectiveness for medical diagnosis or treatment before
it can be offered to patients.15 A balance must therefore be struck between these two
characteristics, with stricter testing and oversight required of those devices exposing
users to higher levels of risk.
User safety is rightly a foremost concern when marketing devices to patients, who,
as consumers, inhabit a highly vulnerable position: they are suffering from an affliction
that necessitates their consumption of a therapeutic good, but lack the personal knowl-
edge to make informed choices in this regard and are almost completely reliant upon
the information and advice provided bymedical professionals andmedical devicemar-
keters.16
But user safety considerations are not exclusive to medical device regulation.
Though not as stringent, there is very compelling law with regard to the safety of de-
vices intended for general consumers, and the openpresentation of any potential harms
attendant with their use.
First, various government agencies have Congressional mandates to ensure the
safety of general products.The Federal Trade Commission can take action against ‘un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce’;17 a power it has employed
liberally to regulate ‘sales of hazardous or systematically defective products or services
without adequate disclosures’.18 In addition, the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion has the following purposes:
(1) to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated with
consumer products;
14 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2009).
15 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (2012) (Classifying medical devices based on their safety and effectiveness). See also
Richard A. Merrill,The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1753
(1996) (‘Before a new therapeutic drug or medical device can be commercialized in the United States, it must
meet the safety and effectiveness requirements of the [FDA].’).
16 Eg Steven Joffe & Robert D. Truong, Consent to Medical Care: The Importance of Fiduciary Context, in THE
ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 347, 351 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds. 2010)
(Explaining the inherently vulnerable position of medical patients as consumers of therapeutic products);
ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 62 (1987) (‘[P]atients may have limited ability to understand the precise na-
ture of the available options or weigh rationally the risks and benefits of the alternatives.’); Nancy M.P. King,
TheLine BetweenClinical Innovation andHumanExperimentation, 32 SETONHALLL.REV. 573, 574 (2002) (‘All
sick patients are a vulnerable population to at least some degree.’).
17 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006).
18 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION 1 (1983), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf (last accessed Apr. 12, 2016).
Minding the ‘gaps’ in the federal regulation  313
(2) to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer prod-
ucts;
(3) to develop uniform safety standards for consumer products and to mini-
mize conflicting State and local regulations; and
(4) to promote research and investigation into the causes and prevention of
product-related deaths, illnesses, and injuries.19
Second, products liability law serves to hold producers accountable for the harm
their products reap. Particularly, it
operates largely on products that have observable utility and hidden risks, relative to the
safer alternatives available on the market. The observable-utility feature offers an advan-
tage that attracts consumers. The hidden-risk feature leads to injuries. This combination
of features is unlikely to be regulated well by the market. The market is likely to fail, for
these products, in providing incentives for optimal consumptionor for producers tomake
welfare-enhancing design changes. In contrast, for products with open and obvious risks,
the market is likely to regulate optimally, in the sense that where alternative designs ex-
ist that offer equivalent utility and less risk, the market will effectively exclude the riskier
products.20
This body of law therefore encourages the disclosure of risk, and the divulgement
of and seeking of accountability for hidden risk through legal actions addressing harm
suffered.21
Finally, where the risk accompanying a widely used product is sufficiently proven
and severe, Congress has taken action to mandate specifications and warnings neces-
sary for its manufacture and marketing.22
Thus, as opposed to its focus on safety, what is more unique to the regulation of
medical devices, compared to that of general products, is a commensurate focus on
effectiveness.23 While the classification of an apparatus once it is labeled a medical
19 15 U.S.C. § 2051. See also About CPSC, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, http://www.cpsc.gov/
en/About-CPSC/ (accessesdMar. 17, 2016)(‘CPSC is chargedwith protecting the public from unreasonable
risks of injury or death associated with the use of thousands of types of consumer products under the agency’s
jurisdiction.’).
20 Keith N. Hylton,TheLaw and Economics of Products Liability, 88 NOTREDAME L. REV. 2457, 2458 (2013). See
alsoGaryT. Schwartz,NewProducts, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58N.Y.U. L.REV. 796 (1983)
(Providing a comprehensive account of the development of products liability law); Hildy Bowbeer, Wendy F.
Lumish & Jeffrey A. Cohen,Warning! Failure to Read This Article May be Hazardous to Your Failure to Warn
Defense, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 439, 439 (2000) (Outlining failure-to-warn claims, which are ‘among the
most common allegations in products liability litigation’). Cf. Wexler, supra note 1, at 676 (Noting that the
tDCS device ‘market [for general consumers]may take care of itself.That is, absent amaterial price difference,
consumers will opt for the safest and most effective product’).
21 Indeed, this area of law serves the same functionwith regard tomedical devices. EgEfthimiosParasidis,Patients
Over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation of Medical Products, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 929, 933
(2011) (‘Given the limitations of FDA review, tort law has traditionally served as a complementary means of
regulating medical products and an additional layer of consumer protection’).
22 15U.S.C. ch. 25, 26, 29, 33 (repealed), 35 (repealed), 36, and 86 (Instituting special regulations for themanu-
facture and sale of flammable fabrics, household refrigerators, switchblade knives, brake fluid (repealed), seat
belts (repealed), cigarettes, and children’s bicycle helmets).
23 The FTC can monitor product effectiveness through its mandate to prevent unfair or deceptive commercial
acts or practices, but it is hard to argue that this makes the focus on effectiveness under general consumer
products regulation commensurate to that on safety.
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device—which determines the degree of government oversight applied to it—is largely
a function of risk, ‘[a]pproval [for use] requires a finding that the device is safe and
effective—or, more accurately, provides benefits that outweigh its risks’.24 And regula-
tors determine the requisite benefit needed to offset any risk, not patients. This differs
greatly from general product settings, where regulations and incentives push for risk
disclosure and mitigation, but benefit assessment is largely left to consumers. Such a
dichotomy is due to the comparably vulnerable position of patients, as noted above,25
which supports the clinical finding of benefit and a government risk-benefit analysis
prior to a device being approved for medical use.26
We do, however, wish to briefly note an important concern. If devices marketed to
general consumers are regulated such that safety is accounted for but effectiveness is
left to user discretion, this potentially allows for the creation andmass consumption of
devices that, while not harmful, have no actual effect. Such a situation could do signif-
icant damage to the field of tDCS research—eg diminish funding—if the technology
gains an undeserved reputation for being a pseudoscience, or evenworse, a scam.27 But
despite this worry, it is not the responsibility of the government to protect the scientific
reputation of a technology, only the safety and freedom of its citizens.
With the proof of effectiveness facet of medical device regulation in mind, calls for
the blanket application of this legal framework to all tDCS devices are presently un-
substantiated. The mere existence of risk, let alone its absence and simply an appre-
hension of risk, is a tenuous reason to label something a medical device and demand
stringent showings of effectiveness. General products regulations take safety into ac-
count, andordinary consumers, as opposed to patients, are capable of decidingwhether
a given device works for them. For these reasons, compelling tDCS devices marketed
to the general public for cognitive enhancement to meet the same premarket approval
requirements asmedical deviceswouldplace anundueburdenonproducers.Thediffer-
ential regulation of the same product depending on the market for which it is intended
is therefore not intrinsically inappropriate in this instance.28
THE ‘GAPS’ IN FEDERAL tDCS DEVICE REGULATION
In her article, Wexler admirably demonstrates that there exists no general regulatory
gap when it comes to tDCS devices. That is, even if a given device is not categorized
as a medical device, an extensive regulatory framework still applies to it. But there has
blossomed a body of scholarship contending that, rather than there existing a general
24 Richard Merrill, FDA Regulatory Requirements as Tort Standards, 12 J. L. & POL’Y 549, 555 (2004) (emphasis
added).
25 Supra note 16.
26 The FDA’s ‘paternalistic’ place in this process has, however, been consistently debated, with many supporting
the Administration’s current role and others advocating formore patient involvement. Eg Lewis A. Grossman,
FDA and the Rise of the Empowered Patient, in FDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE CHALLENGES OF
REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 59–75 (Holly Fernandez Lynch & I. Glenn Cohen eds. 2015)
(Presenting a general outline of this debate).
27 Cf. Katherine Bourzac, Bright Sparks, 531NATURE S6, S8 (2016) (Indicating that the widespread public avail-
ability of tDCS devices makes the technology appear to be ‘snake oil’ rather than a legitimate scientific appa-
ratus).
28 Cf. Wexler, supra note 1, at 684 (‘[T]here are many ‘dual use’ products that are identical in technology but
regulated differently based on intended use.’).
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regulatory gap with regard to tDCS devices, such gaps are present within the medical
device and general products regulatory frameworks specifically.29 We disagree.
Every argument for the amending of medical device rules to cover all tDCS devices
explicitly or implicitly asserts that complementary gaps exist within both medical de-
vice and general products regulations.30 The alleged gap in general products law is that
this framework does not necessitate the proper level of inquiry into the safety and effec-
tiveness of tDCS devices. But, as presented in the previous section, these regulations,
though not as stringent as those for medical devices, address user safety fairly robustly,
particularly given the overall lack of proven risk attendant with the use of tDCS de-
vices. Moreover, intensive inquiries into device effectiveness are not inherently neces-
sary when the product in question is not marketed to patients. As such, any gap in the
coverage of tDCS devices under general products regulations has thus far failed to be
convincingly presented. For these same reasons, coinciding contentions that medical
device regulations contain a gap because they do not apply to all tDCS devices are also
unpersuasive.
But, in addition, the language of federal medical device regulations does not neces-
sarily exclude tDCS devices marketed to general consumers. As noted above, a device
is legally a medical device if one of two conditions apply: (1) it is intended for ther-
apeutic diagnosis or treatment; or (2) affects the structure or function of the body.31
These requirements are broad, and courts have given the FDA a great deal of deference
in applying them.32
It is the FDA that determines the intended use of a device, not the producer, al-
though these determinations can be disputed in court.33 Generally, the Administration
looks to producer representations of the device to the public— ie labeling and advertis-
ing language.34 But it can also consider amuchwider array of factors: the circumstances
surrounding product distribution, statements by manufacturers, instruction booklets,
financial arrangements, shareholder reports, employee and third-party statements, and
actual consumer use.35 While these sources give producers the opportunity to influ-
ence the legal categorization of their products—and therefore the level of government
scrutiny and regulatory burdens they are subjected to—theFDAultimately has a broad
space in which to look for qualifying representations and significant authority to con-
strue language as it deems appropriate.36 Moreover, the FDA’s interpretations of intent
29 Supra note 9.
30 Id.
31 21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
32 Andrew E. Costa, Negligence Per Se Theories in Pharmaceutical & Medical Device Litigation, 57 ME. L. REV. 51,
81 (2005) (‘The broad grant of authority to the FDA, in conjunction with its scientific expertise, has earned
the FDA a substantial degree of deference from the courts.’).
33 Deborah E. Tolomeo&Laurie A.Clarke,Medical Devices:TheObvious, the Readily-Accepted, and the Surprising,
1 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 117, 136 (2008) (‘Ultimately, FDA, rather than the manufacturer, determines
whether a claim is for a health benefit.’).
34 Wexler, supra note 1, at 683–84; Tolomeo & Clarke, supra note 33, at 123 (‘FDA generally infers the manu-
facturer’s intended use of a product based on the manufacturer’s claims about the product’).
35 Wexler, supra note 1, at 683–86; Tolomeo &Clarke, supra note 33, at 123–27.
36 See Tolomeo & Clarke supra note 33, at 136. But see Wexler, supra note 1, at 679 (‘[T]o a large extent, man-
ufacturers can maintain control over how their products are regulated.’).
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are almost always accepted by courts when legally challenged.37 Thus, if the FDA can
essentially look wherever it wants to find a device’s intended use for a medical purpose
and is given substantial deference in these determinations, it is probable that it could
legitimately envelope tDCS devices marketed to the general public for cognitive en-
hancement in its statutory authority.38 And such action would likely withstand judicial
scrutiny.
Yet even if the first relevant, and highly deferential, condition for being legally cat-
egorized as a medical device fails, the second arguably provides the FDA with an even
broader mandate to apply its oversight. Certainly, if construed overly literally, the re-
quirement that a device affect the structure or function of the body could theoretically
encompass almost every product on the market.39 The FDA and courts have therefore
been fairly judicious in administering this condition, usually using it in conjunctionwith
the medical purpose condition.40 Nevertheless, devices’ effects on the structure and
function of the body have, at times, been liberally employed to capture them within
the FDA’s medical device regulatory authority, seemingly on their own.41 Given that
tDCS devices explicitly introduce electricity into the brain tomodulate the organ’s op-
eration,42 they clearly affect the body’s structure or function. If the FDA chose to cat-
egorize tDCS devices targeting the general market under this condition, it is unlikely
that courts would overturn such action.
For all of the aforementioned reasons, there does not presently exist a federal regula-
tory gap when it comes tDCS devices in either general products or medical device law.
Instead, the current extents of coverage and levels of oversight of these frameworks are
appropriate given current understandings of these instruments. Furthermore, any lack
of application of medical device rules to tDCS devices marketed to general consumers
for cognitive enhancement are most likely a function of FDA enforcement rather than
limitations in regulatory language.
37 Supra note 35. But seeWexler, supra note 1, at 685 (Noting a situation inwhich a court ruled against the FDA’s
extension of its authority over a product).
38 See Tolomeo & Clarke, supra note 33, at 136 (Providing examples of products regulated as medical devices
for simply ‘conceivably hav[ing] a health-related purpose’.). See also Fregni et al., supra note 7, at 23 (‘Based
on the FDA definition of a medical device, and recognizing the spectrum of devices regulated, it is thus logical
to include tDCS devices—whether indicated for medical treatments, diagnostic purposes, wellness aids, en-
tertainment devices, or for any other purpose—as aMedical Device according to the FDA.’). Cf.Maslen et al.,
supra note 8, at 79 (Presenting the argument that cognitive enhancement can be interpreted to be a medical
purpose).
39 See Wexler, supra note 1, at 681 (‘[A] large number of products—from high-heeled shoes to chairs to
treadmills—can be said to be intended to affect the body’s structure or function.’); Action on Smoking and
Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (‘Anything which stimulates any of the senses may be
said, in some perhaps insignificant degree, to affect the functions of the body of man . . . . Surely, the legislators
did not mean to be as all-inclusive as a literal interpretation of this clause would compel us to be.’) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
40 Eg Wexler, supra note 1, at 681 (Describing the restraint employed by the FDA and courts in applying the
‘affects the structure or function of the body’ condition).
41 This condition has extended the ambit of FDA medical device regulatory authority to several devices with a
questionable medical purpose or ostensibly lacking one: alarms that sound when an elderly individual needs
assistance, dental braces, and tanning beds. Tolomeo &Clarke, supra note 33, at 133–36.
42 Parazzini et al., supra note 2, at 1.
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CONCLUSION
Legal frameworks should always remain attentive to technological progress, but such
progress does not always militate toward substantial change. Accordingly, our work
builds on that of Wexler to demonstrate that existing federal regulations applicable to
tDCS devices are currently adequate for their responsible marketing to both patients
and general consumers.
